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AbSTRACT
Objective(s): To assess how willing people would be to join a voluntary health 
insurance scheme and to see how they respond to changes in the benefit package. We 
also examined willingness to cross-subsidise the poor.
Design: Cross-sectional study. 
Subjects: Two thousand two hundread and twenty four households comprising of 
1,163 uninsured household heads asked about their willingness to pay for insurance 
in seven districts/councils (three urban and four rural) and 1,061 insured households 
were asked about their willingness to pay for insurance premiums for the poor in 
their community.  Uninsured respondents were presented with two scenarios, the first 
reflected the current design of the Community Health Fund/Tiba Kwa Kadi (CHF/
TIKA), the second offered expanded benefits, and included inpatient care in public 
facilities and transport.  
Results: Only 30 % of uninsured rural households were willing to pay more than Tsh 
5,000 the current premium level, their average amount was Tsh 10,741, while in urban 
areas one percent of households were willing to pay more than Tsh 5,000. There was 
very limited willingness to pay more than 5,000 Tsh, even with an expanded package 
in rural areas.  Household from rural areas were more willing to cross-subsidise the 
poor, but contribution levels were higher in urban areas. 
Conclusion: Communities need to be sensitised about the existence of the CHF/TIKA 
to encourage enrollment. Expanding the benefit package would further increase 
enrollment. However, few people would be willing to pay more than the current 
premium. 
INTROdUCTION 
increasingly moves are being made to expand health 
insurance cover in africa as a means of reducing out of 
pocket payments as well as improving access to formal 
health care, in line with universal coverage objectives 
(1). However, the fragmentation of insurance schemes 
in many settings, along with limited regulation of 
the health insurance sector, has hampered expansion 
efforts in many countries (2). a particular challenge 
facing many lower income countries is how to expand 
coverage among the informal sector which constitute 
a large proportion of the population (3).  With a few 
exceptions like rwanda, it is notoriously challenging 
to achieve high levels of coverage among this group, 
as contributions are typically voluntary (4), and it is 
costly to shemes targeting the informal sector (5) and 
enforce contributions (4). further, poorer segments of 
the informal sector often have limited understanding 
of the concept of risk pooling (6). Typically the benefit 
package offered to the informal sector is limited, to 
ensure that premiums remain affordable.
 a further challenge, in the context of income 
constrained economies, is how to finance and sustain 
the expansion of health insurance, and to what extent 
mandatory insurance contributions from the formal 
sector can be used to cross-subsidise contributions 
from informal sector groups. a question of particular 
pertinence, therefore, when considering the goal of 
universal health coverage, is how willing individuals 
are to cross-subsidise poorer groups (7).
 a number of studies have been carried out to 
assess willingness to pay (WtP) for community health 
insurance schemes to inform premium setting in rural 
and urban areas (8-10). WtP has also been used to 
explore altruism (selfless concern for the welfare 
of others) within the health sector (11). all of these 
studies employed the contingent valuation method to 
measure WtP.  this is a survey-based method used for 
setting prices for a given service or placing monetary 
vales on goods and services not bought or sold in a 
market place (8). WTP was defined as the maximum 
amount a household or individual is hypothetically 
prepared to give up in order to benefit from health 
insurance or the amount that people value the health 
of others in the community.
 However, to our knowledge, to date, no studies 
have examined the responsiveness of WtP to changes 
in the benefit package offered by an insurance scheme, 
and only one study has examined willingness to 
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cross-subsidise poorer groups in relation to insurance 
(7).
 against this background, the current study used 
the contingent valuation method to elicit household’s 
willingness to join (WtJ) voluntary health insurance 
and their willingness to pay (WtP) for such a scheme 
among the uninsured in tanzania, and examined how 
their willingness to join and pay varied according to 
the benefit package offered.  The study also examined 
the willingness to cross-subsidise the poor among 
the currently insured.
MATERIALS ANd METHOdS
Study Setting: tanzania has a highly fragmented 
system of health insurance. numerous insurance 
schemes exist covering different segments of the 
population, with national coverage remaining low 
at around 13% in 2010 (12). the national Health 
insurance (nHif) is the largest scheme targeting 
the public formal fund sector. The NHIF is financed 
through mandatory payroll contributions amounting 
to 3% of salaries from the employee which is matched 
by the employer, and covers outpatient and inpatient 
health care from a large range of accredited health 
providers. the contributor, spouse and a maximum 
of four dependants are covered by this scheme. Dar-
es-salaam. there are a number of schemes covering 
the private formal sector, however, coverage among 
this group remains very low.
 the community Health fund (cHf) which has 
been operating since 2001 for rural populations, and 
the Tiba kwa Kadi (tiKa) which has been implemented 
since 2009 in urban councils is a voluntary insurance 
scheme targeting the informal sector. the premium 
typically ranges from tsh 5,000 - 15,000 per annum per 
household () and covers a couple and their children 
under 18 years. the scheme covers primary level 
public facilities and limited referral care in some 
districts (13). the government matches contributions 
made by cHf/tiKa members through a matching 
grant.  High dropout rates and low enrolment  have 
been among the challenges facing the cHf/tiKa in 
tanzania (9), due to poor quality of health care in 
public facilities and limited access to referral facilities 
(13).
 There is a huge discrepancy between the benefit 
package offered to nHif members compared with 
cHf/tiKa members, as well as the amount of 
revenue generated by each scheme. While there is 
cross-subsidisation across nHif members, there is 
no cross-subsidisation across the schemes. nor is 
there cross-subsidisation across districts/councils 
for the cHf/tiKa.
 there have been growing national commitments 
to scale up health insurance coverage in tanzania, 
with the aim being to reach 45 % by 2015 (12). to 
facilitate insurance expansion, the nHif has been 
given a mandate to oversee the management of the 
cHf/tiKa over the coming years and plans are 
being made to expand the benefit package available 
to cHf/tiKa members. 
 However, there are three points of uncertainty 
regarding how health insurance will evolve in the 
country: how willing people in urban areas will 
be to join voluntary insurance; how enrollment 
might increase in response to changes in the benefit 
package; and the acceptability and feasibility of cross-
subsidisation between formal and informal sectors.
Data Collection: one thousand six hundread and 
sixty three uninsured and 1,061 insured household 
heads were interviewed in 2008. the survey was 
conducted in three urban councils (Morogoro, ilala, 
and Kinondoni) and four rural districts (Kigoma, 
Kilosa, Mbulu and singida). these districts/councils 
were selected purposively. the rural districts were 
selected such that they had a minimum level of cHf 
coverage (at least 10%), and to offer some geographical 
variation. in Mbulu and singida districts the cHf 
benefit package included hospital care at designated 
district hospitals as well as public primary care, while 
in Kigoma and Kilosa districts the benefit package 
did not include inpatient care. a total of two councils 
in Dar-es-salaam were selected as Dar-es-salaam 
currently offers the greatest range of insurance options 
to its population. Morogoro was selected as a second 
urban site, as the tiKa was about to be introduced 
there, and the informal sector had no health insurance 
options at the time of the study, consistent with the 
majority of urban councils in the country.  
 the uninsured household heads were asked 
about their willingness to join (WtJ) the cHf/
tiKa and how much they would be willing to pay 
(WtP) for such insurance. they were presented with 
two scenarios, the first reflecting the current design 
of the cHf/tiKa, the second offering expanded 
benefits, including inpatient care in public facilities 
and transport. In the case of the first scenario, all 
respondents were asked if they would be willing 
to pay the current average rural area premium (tsh 
5,000). in urban areas, the open-ended question format 
was used to elicit maximum willingness-to-pay, on the 
assumption that willingness-to-pay may be higher in 
these areas. Willingness to cross-subsidise questions 
were addressed to insured household heads. they 
were asked: “Would you be willing to contribute to any 
health insurance scheme or to the council any amount of 
money so that the very poorest in your community can 
benefit from free care when they are sick?”. those who said 
“yes”, were asked to state how much they would be 
willing to pay per annum to protect the poor. socio-
economic and demographic data were obtained from 
all households.  Households were ranked into five 
wealth groups (based on ownership of assets and 
housing characteristics) from poorest to least poor. 
Data analysis were done using stata version 11.0.
Data Analysis: Bivariate analysis was done to assess 
the level of association between WtJ, WtP for 
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insurance and willingness to cross-subsidise the 
poor and household wealth and place of residence 
(urban/rural). Statistical significance was examined 
using Pearson chi-square (for binary or categorical 
variables) and the Mann-Whitney U test for continuous 
variables. in estimating determinants of actual WtP 
and willingness to cross-subsidise exploration of 
multiple models (two part model, the tobit model 
and the heckman - sample selection model) was done. 
the two part model performed best and is presented 
here. Hence, a logit model was used to assess the 
determinants of WtJ community health insurance 
and willingness to cross-subsidise the poor and 
an ordinary least squares (ols) log linear model 
was used to assess the determinants of the amounts 
people were WtP for insurance in urban areas, and 
the amounts people were willing to cross-subsidise 
in both rural and urban areas. these models were 
used to examine theoretical validity which assesses 
the extent to which the results are consistent with 
the following a  priori expectations (equation 1) (14). 
We hypothesised that willingness to pay would be 
affected by socio-demographic variables. other 
variables which could affect WtP include: number 
of elderly in the household, previous care seeking 
behaviour and eligibility for exemptions (table 
3). We also included the type of insurance scheme 
as a variable in the cross-subsidisation model to 
assess whether members of the nHif were more 
or less willing to cross-subsidise compared to cHf 
members.
equation 1: empirical Model of WtJ/WtP for Health 
insurance 
WTP= α + β1X1 + β2X2 +……+ βn-1Xn-1 + βnXn 
………………………1
the dependant variable for the logit model was binary 
(1= willing to join insurance scheme/willingness 
to cross-subsidise, 0= not willing) and for the log 
linear model dependent variable was the natural 
logarithm of actual amount stated while α, was the 
intercept; β, were coefficients of explanatory variables 
X. computation of marginal effects on logit models 
was undertaken.
 We started by estimating the full model which 
contained all explanatory variables which might affect 
WtP for health insurance/ Wt cross-subsidise. We 
also estimated a reduced model, using the backward 
elimination procedure in which we eliminated those 
variables with the highest p–value conditional on 
the p–value being bigger than some pre-determined 
level ( p>0.60). the models were subjected to various 
diagnostic tests, for the logit model we used the link 
test for model specification while for log linear models 
the reset test (15) was used to ensure the model 
was appropriately specified and to test for omitted 
variable bias (16). other tests on the log liner model 
included shapiro-Wilk W test which was used to test 
the normality of the error term; the Breusch-Pagan 
to test the null hypothesis that the variance of the 
residuals is homogenous and the Vif (variance inflation 
factor) was examined to check for the presence of 
multicollinearity (16).
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics: the majority of the household 
heads were male (76%), aged 44 years, and 8% of 
household heads assessed their health status to be 
poor (Table 2). On average there were five members 
within a household. there were some differences in 
the characteristics of insured compared to uninsured 
household heads. the insured were more likely 
to be married, christian, of higher wealth status, 
employed in the formal sector and have completed 
primary education than the uninsured (table 2). the 
insured were also more likely to have sought care 
in the previous month (24% of the insured had an 
outpatient visit in the previous month compared to 
13% of the uninsured), and they were less likely to 
be eligible for exemptions (8 % of the insured were 
eligible for exemptions compared to 19% of the 
uninsured) (table 2).
Willingness to Join and Pay for Health Insurance: table 3 
shows uninsured respondents were significantly more 
willing to join health insurance in urban than rural 
areas at the proposed rate of tsh 5,000 (93% compared 
to 74%) (p<0.001). Moreover, there was a significant 
difference in the proportion of households in urban 
and rural areas willing to prepay for voluntary 
health insurance across socio-economic groups (p 
< 0.05). Willingness to pre-pay was consistently 
higher among higher than lower wealth groups. 
The size of the proposed benefit package affected 
people’s willingness to join in rural areas, with 78% 
being willing to join in Mbulu and singida districts 
where inpatient care was covered compared to 72% 
in Kigoma and Kilosa districts where only primary 
care was covered (p < 0.1) (table 3).  However, there 
was relatively limited willingness to pay more than 
tsh 5,000 in either setting (in urban areas, only a third 
of respondents were willing to pay more than tsh 
5,000 whereas only 1% were willing to do so in rural 
areas).  among those who were willing to pay more 
than tsh 5,000 there was no difference in the average 
amounts stated (mean tsh 10,741 (Median:10,000) 
in urban areas; mean tsh 10,000 (Median 10,000) 
in rural areas) (data not shown). Were the benefit 
package to expand in Kigoma and Kilosa, 79% of 
respondents would have been willing to join the 
CHF.  In contrast, in urban areas, the benefit package 
had little effect on people’s WtJ.  further, there was 
very limited willingness to pay more than tsh 5,000, 
even with an expanded benefit package (only 2% of 
respondents were willing to pay more than tsh 5,000 
in rural areas compared to 39% in urban areas) [Data 
not shown].  
Determinants of Willingness to Join and Pay for Health 
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Table 1 
Description of independent variables hypothesized to explain WTJ/WTP for insurance and willingness to cross-
subsidise
independent variables  WtJ/WtP for insurance Wt cross-subsidise
gender Male headed households will be more WtP and cross-subsidise than 
female headed households due to greater economic power.
Married Married household heads will be more WtJ/WtP and willing to 
cross-subsidise than single households because they can more easily 
mobilize resources and they are more likely to have children/family 
friends who will be in need of health care.
religion no prior hypothesis
occupation People with formal employment will be more WtJ/WtP and willing 





 Poor People whose self assessed health is poor will be more WtJ/WtP 
because they are in greater need than those with good self assessed 
health.  they are less likely to be willing to cross-subsidise the poor 
as they have to care themselves.
People whose self assessed health is average will be more WtJ/WtP 
as they are in greater need than those with good self assessed health. 
they are less likely to be willing to cross-subsidise the poor as they 
have to care for themselves. 
education People with formal education will be more WtJ/WtP as well as willing 
to cross-subsidise because they are more aware of the importance for 
health care.
Dar es salaam compared to rural households, households in Dar es salaam will be 
more WtJ and WtP for health insurance because they are exposed 
to more accredited facilities, and have more economic activities where 
they earn income.  they will be less willing to cross-subsidise the poor 
than those in rural areas as there is less solidarity.
Morogoro compared to rural households, households in Morogoro will be more 
WtJ and WtP for health insurance because they are exposed to more 
accredited facilities, and have more economic activities where they earn 
income.  they will be less willing to cross-subsidise the poor than 
those in rural areas as there is less solidarity.
Dar es salaam/
Morogoro
compared to those in Morogoro, households in Dar es salaam will be 
more WtJ and WtP for voluntary health insurance because of having 
more economic activities where they earn income.
exemption eligibility those who are eligible for exemptions will be less likely to join and 
pay for health insurance as well as cross-subsidising the poor, because 
they are less aware of health care costs.
nHif na nHif members are more willing to 
cross-subsidise than cHf members 
because they have a more sustainable 
income
outpatient visit to a 
formal provider in 
previous month
an individual who had a recent outpatient visit is more likely to 
be WtJ/WtP for insurance as they are in need of care; also they 
might have been made aware of the insurance scheme by health care 
attendants. they will be willing to cross-subsidise the poor because 
they are aware of the costs of health care.   
age WtJ insurance is likely to increase with age due to greater need for 
care.  However, WtP for insurance is likely to reduce with age due 
to lower income levels of the elderly. the elderly will be less willing 
to cross-subsidise the poor because of their own needs and income 
constraints.
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income Higher income levels lead to higher WtJ/WtP for insurance and 
willingness to cross subsidise the poor.
Household size larger households will be more WtJ health insurance as the premium 
per person will be lower.  they will be less WtP and willing to 
cross-subsidise the poor, due to the greater constraints on household 
income.
above 59 years Households with a larger number of elderly people will be more willing 
to join insurance due to their health care needs, but less willing to pay 
and less willing to cross-subsidise due to their more limited income.
 
Table 2
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the surveyed households
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insurance cover 1= nHif member  
0 = cHf member
62.3
37.7
outpatient visit to 
formal providers in 
previous month
1 = households 








continuous variables Mean (standard Deviation)
age Household age in 
years 44.08(14.2) 41(12.2) 44.38(14.4)
income Wealth index value 
(proxy of income) 0.245(3.0) 2.69(3.6) -0.094(2.7)
Household size number of people 
who eat and sleep 
within the house 
5.18(2.6) 5.22(2.9) 5.18(2.6)
above 59 years number of people 
who are above 59 







Willingness to pre-pay Tsh 5,000 per household per year, by geographic location and socio-economic status among 
uninsured respondents
 rural     urban rural  
      urban   
      comparison
Variables Kigoma/ Mbulu/ p-value overall
 Kilosa singida  rural 
Wealth n          n  n          n         p-value 
groups (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Q1 32(70.1) 68(73.6) 0.477 101(72.0) 6(100) 0.015 
(Poorest)
Q2   45(72.2) 37(73.1) 0.605 82(72.5) 11(78.5)   0.002
Q3   43(65.8) 40(84.3) 0.038 80(71.4) 28(92.5) 0.001
Q4 43(74.4) 24(89.6) 0.152 66(77.5) 58(90.2) 0.001
Q5 (least Poor) 22(79.0) 10(83.1) 0.650 33(80.1) 148(97.3) 0.001
overall   193(72.3) 181(78.1) 0.080 371(74.3) 265(93.1) 0.001
Note to Table: Kigoma/Kilosa have a limited benefit package including primary care; Mbulu 
singida have a broader package that includes inpatient care.
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Table 4
Determinants of willingness to join (WTJ) and willingness to pay (WTP) for health insurance
 logit model - WtJ health insurance  ols- log linear model WtP for  
   health insurance in urban areas
Independent Coefficients (SE) Marginal effects Full Model Reduced 
variables     (SE) Coefficient (SE) Model   
    Coefficient (SE)
gender  0.844 (0.27)** 0.139 (0.05)** 0.152 (0.09)* 0.121 (0.08)
Married  0.071 (0.27) 0.010 (0.04) 0.039 (0.08) 
religion  0.505 (0.22) ** 0.072 (0.03) ** -0.008 (0.07) 
occupation -0.553 (0.53) -0.092 (0.10) -0.086 (0.08) 
Health Poor -0.278 (0.34) -0.043 (0.05) -0.079 (0.15) 
Health average 0.283 (0.25) 0.038 (0.03) 0.105 (0.08) 0.100 (0.07)
education 0.438 (0.28)* 0.068 (0.05)* 0.098 (0.11) 
Dar es salaam  1.925 (0.51) *** 0.161 (0.03)*** 0.132 (0.8)* 0.125 (0.07)*
Morogoro  1.411 (0.36) *** 0.152 (0.02) ***  
exemption eligibility -0.400 (0.48) -0.062 (0.08) -0.070 (0.12) 
outpatient visit to  0.270 (0.32) 0.036 (0.04) -0.058 (0.08) 
formal provider in 
previous month 
age  -0.004 (0.01) -0.001 (0.00) 0.006 (0.00)* 0.002 (0.00)
income  0.083 (0.05) * 0.012 (0.01) * 0.054 (0.01)*** 0.052 (0.01)***
Household size -0.046 (0.04) -0.007 (0.01) -0.010 (0.01) 
above 59 years  0.124 (0.23) 0.017 (0.03) -0.042 (0.07) 
number of observation  757 256 257
Wald chi2/f statistics  73.3*** 4.74*** 11.1***
Pseudo/adjusted r2 0.103 0.195 0.181
Note *, **, *** shows significance at 10%, 5 % and 1 %, MFX - marginal effect and se - standard 
error  
Table 5
Determinants of Willingness to Cross-subsidise the Poor
 logit Model   ols log liner model WtP to  
   cross subsidise
Independent Coefficient Marginal Full Model Reduced Model
variables    (SE) Effects (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
gender  0.450 (0.20)** 0.108 (0.05)** 0.171 (0.16) 0.212 (0.16)
Married  0.032 (0.18) 0.008 (0.04)  0.049 (0.15) 
religion  -0.012 (0.18) -0.003 (0.04) -0.133 (0.12) 
occupation 0.340 (0.47) 0.084 (0.12) 0.554 (0.22)** 0.580 (0.22)**
Health Poor -0.529 (0.32)* -0.125 (0.07)* -0.155 (0.28) 
Health average -0.361 (0.18)** -0.087 (0.04)** -0.074 (0.12) 
education 0.206 (0.28) 0.050 (0.06) 0.261 (0.22) 
Dar es salaam  -0.493 (0.41) -0.116 (0.09) 0.628 (0.31)** 0.691 (0.29)**
Morogoro  0.012 (0.30) 0.003 (0.07) -0.307 (0.24) 
exemption eligibility -0.362 (0.42) -0.087 (0.09) 0.189 (0.29) 
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Insurance: results from the logit model showed that 
gender, residing in Dar es salaam or Morogoro, 
having a formal education, religion, and income 
significantly affect household WTJ the CHF/TIKA, 
when controlling for other variables, consistent 
with prior expectations (table 4). residing in Dar-
es-salaam and Morogoro increased the probability 
of being willing to join voluntary health insurance 
by sixteen and fifteen percent respectively. Being 
from a male headed household and having formal 
education increased the probability of willing to join 
insurance by fourteen and seven percentage points 
respectively. The coefficients on some of the variables 
(occupation, poor self assessed health status, and 
household size) had signs that were inconsistent 
with prior expectations, however they were not 
statistically significant.
 the log linear model showed that being from a 
male headed household, age, income of households, 
and residing in Dar es salaam were the only variables 
influencing the actual amounts households were 
willing to pay for health insurance when controlling 
for other variables (Table 4). The coefficients on some 
of the variables (occupation, age, and having a recent 
outpatient visit) had signs that were inconsistent 
with prior expectations, however, they were not 
statistically significant. 
Willingness to Cross-subsidize the Poor: overall there 
was a greater willingness to cross-subsidize the poor 
among rural compared to urban households (46.0% 
and 41.2% respectively (p < 0.05)), but the actual 
average amounts stated were lower in rural compared 
to urban areas (mean tsh 6,620 (median tsh 5,000) 
and tsh 13,940 (median tsh 10,000) respectively) 
[data not shown]. Moreover, the proportion of nHif 
members who were willing to cross-subsidize the 
poor was significantly lower compared to CHF 
nHif member  -0.551 (0.45) -0.136 (0.11) 0.081 (0.23) 0.055 (0.22)
outpatient visit to 0.295 (0.19)*  0.073 (0.05)* -0.301 (0.14)** -0.297 (0.14)** 
formal provider in 
previous month 
age  -0.015 (0.01)* -0.004 (0.00)* 0.012 (0.01)* 0.009 (0.01)*
income 0.039 (0.04) 0.009 (0.01) 0.033 (0.03)* 0.046 (0.02) 
Household size 0.037 (0.03) 0.009 (0.01) 0.003 (0.02) 
above 59 years  -0.009 (0.17) -0.002 (0.04) -0.166 (0.14) 
number of observation  984 443 443
Wald chi2/f statistics  51.4*** 5.43*** 11.98***
Pseudo/adjusted r2 0.043 0.155 0.141
Note *, **, *** shows significance at 10%, 5 % and 1 %, MFX - marginal effect and SE - standard 
error
members (39% compared to 53%) (p < 0.01), but nHif 
members were willing to cross-subsidise significantly 
higher average amounts than cHf members (mean 
tsh 13,690 (median tsh 5,000) and tsh 4,790 (median 
tsh 5,000), p<0.01).
Determinants of Willingness to Cross-Subsidise the 
Poor: table 5 shows the determinants of household 
willingness to cross-subsidise the poor. Being from 
a male headed household increased the probability 
of being willing to cross-subsidise by 11 percentage 
points. Having a recent outpatient visit to a formal 
provider increased the probability of being willing to 
cross-subsidise the poor by seven percentage points 
(p<0.1). conversely, the elderly, and those with poor 
or average self assessed health were less willing to 
cross-subsidize the poor. The signs of the coefficients 
on all the variables met with prior expectations 
except for household size, although the coefficient 
on this variable was not significant.  The log linear 
model indicated that richer households, and those 
working in the formal sector were willing to pay 
more in cross-subsidises for the poor, consistent with 
expectations (p<0.01). counter to expectations, the 
elderly were more willing to pay for the poor, possibly 
due to a sense of solidarity with the poor, and those 
who had recently sought care were less willing to 
pay for the poor, possibly due to the costs incurred 
when care seeking. The signs on the coefficients of 
exemption eligibility and household size were also 
counter to expectations but these were not statistically 
significant.
dISCUSSION 
this study has shown that informal sector urban 
populations will be willing to join the tiKa scheme in 
urban areas if premiums remain low. However, only a 
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third would be willing to pay more than tsh 5,000 per 
household per year. The findings also indicate that it 
may be possible to substantially expand enrollment 
in the cHf among households in rural areas, if 
awareness of the scheme is increased, and the benefit 
package expands to include hospital care.  However, 
there were few people who would be willing to pay 
more for such increased benefits. This study found 
that female headed households and the poor will be 
less willing and able to pay for insurance, and those 
in urban areas will be willing to pay more.  other 
studies have also found that females were less WtP 
for health insurance than males (8). only one other 
study compared the willingness to pay for insurance 
in urban and rural areas (11) and found that those in 
rural areas were willing to pay significantly more than 
those in urban areas, in contrast to our findings.
 this study also highlighted that people are 
generally willing to cross-subsidise the poor in the 
community. although the proportions who were 
willing to cross-subsidise the poor were slightly lower 
(45%) than those reporting a willingness to purchase 
a mosquito net for the poor reported elsewhere (57%) 
(17). those living in rural areas were more willing to 
cross-subsidise, however, the amounts people were 
willing to cross-subidise were lower compared to 
urban areas. rural dwellers may have been more 
constrained in their ability to pay due to their reliance 
on subsistence farming activities. While income had 
no effect on people’s willingness to cross-subsidise the 
poor, it was a significant determinant of how much 
they would cross-subdisise consistent with Jacobsson 
et al 2005 (18), as was occupation. it was interesting to 
note that both cHf and nHif members were willing 
to cross-subsidise the poor, with the amounts being 
higher for nHif members (43% higher) than cHf 
members although this was not significant in the 
models. the higher willingness to pay among nHif 
members is likely due to the fact they have a stable 
source of income, whereas cHf members largely 
depend on agricultural output.
 a number of policy recommendations for 
expanded insurance coverage in tanzania result 
from this study.  People are willing to join and pay 
for health insurance if they are made aware of the 
principles of insurance and properly understand 
the concept of risk pooling. certain groups were 
found to be less willing and able to pay for insurance 
including female headed households, the elderly, the 
poor and those living in rural areas. consequently, 
these groups might be considered for exemption 
from premium payment, or be offered subsidised 
premiums. currently, districts are supposed to exempt 
the poor from paying for cHf cards (19).  However, 
in practice such exemptions generally do not occur 
due to the difficulty of identifying the poor (13), a 
problem faced in many settings (3). indeed, it can 
be difficult to ascertain income levels among the 
informal sector. Different approaches to identifying 
the poor have been evaluated (20). it was found that 
proxy means testing (ranking based on education, 
household characteristics and asset ownership) and 
participatory wealth ranking have considerable errors 
of exclusion and inclusion compared to means testing 
(ranking based on income or expenditure) in ghana 
(20). although participatory wealth ranking was 
found to work well in Burkina faso (21). However, 
the administrative costs of identifying income through 
these approaches can be significant (20). This study 
suggests that exemptions might be applied to a wider 
range of groups that can be more easily identified, 
such as female headed households, or households 
that have an elderly household head. it would also 
be advisable to charge higher premiums in urban 
compared to rural areas, and in districts with higher 
socio-economic status, as these groups will have a 
greater willingness to pay for insurance. currently 
in tanzania districts have the autonomy to decide on 
the premium level for the district as a whole, which 
facilitates this process. the greater willingness to 
pay for insurance in urban compared to rural areas 
suggests that cross subsidisation should be promoted 
between urban and rural councils/districts for the 
cHf/tiKa.  at present, funds are pooled at the 
district level, but there is no pooling of funds across 
districts. such pooling would also allow for cross-
subsidisation between richer and poorer districts/
councils and increase the financial sustainability of 
the scheme. cHf members indicated a relatively 
high willingness to cross-subsidise poorer groups, 
suggesting that in principle such an approach 
would be acceptable. However, a greater potential 
for cross-subsidisation lies between the nHif and 
the cHf.  indeed, the nHif has been given the 
mandate to manage cHf and increase enrollment. 
this study indicates that nHif members are willing 
to cross-subsidise the poor, and would potentially 
be willing to cross-subsidise cHf members. using 
data derived from this study, nHif members could 
potentially generate tsh 3, 765, 874,000 per annum in 
cross-subsidies (=mean willingness to cross-subsidise 
x 316,460 [nHif principal members in 2008]). this 
amount of money would be sufficient to enroll an 
additional 753,175 cHf members per annum at a 
premium of tsh 5,000 (=3,765,874,000/5,000). this is 
equivalent to 11% (753,175/6,996,036) of households 
in tanzania using 2000 census data, and hence, could 
have a dramatic effect on national insurance coverage, 
and could serve to support almost half of the country’s 
poor. However, it remains to be seen how acceptable 
such a measure would be to a broader range of 
nHif members across the country. it is likely that 
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they would not be willing to support higher income 
cHf members, but rather for their contributions to 
be earmarked to support poorer groups. 
 This study is the first to look at the sensitivity 
of WTP for insurance to changes in the benefit 
package. This findings revealed very little effect of 
an expanded benefit package on WTP, this could be a 
result of our study design which provided only a very 
limited description of benefits, and overall insurance 
design. future studies might explore household 
responsiveness to more specific design issues, such 
as the scope of services covered in the benefit package 
(and inclusion or not of drugs, which are often out 
of stock in public facilities, for example), the degree 
of service quality (in terms of staff availability and 
type of staff, for example), and the premium payment 
method (in cash or in kind, and the timing and 
frequency of payment). for example, in ethiopia a 
study evaluated the willingness of households to 
pay for insurance in terms of labour (the amount of 
labour an individual is willing to contributes in terms 
of person – days times the wage rate reported by the 
individual) (22). Discrete choice experiments would 
be a way of simultaneously addressing preferences 
across such a range of dimensions, and may offer 
more conclusive evidence of how to tailor the design 
of insurance schemes to specific communities to 
maximize and expand enrollment in efforts towards 
universal coverage.
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